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Background 
 Between 1914 and the 1950s, U.S. food nourished many European civilians during war 
and its aftermath. Upon the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, millions of Americans in a 
neutral nation mobilized to relieve the suffering of civilians in Europe through substantial 
contributions of money, food, and clothing, thus beginning a long relationship between 
Americans and Europeans.  Non-profit organizations and U.S. government loans fed much of the 
population of Belgium and Northern France in 1914, using tens of thousands of volunteers and 
hundreds of millions of dollars under the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB), until the 
U.S. entry into the war in 1917.  
 Food, a vital weapon in the Allied blockade strategy of starving the enemy during the 
conflict, became the hope for peace, social stability, and U.S. goodwill in 1919, as former foes 
became the objects of food relief efforts. European men, women and children found themselves 
part of a series of major humanitarian projects under the auspices of the American Relief 
Administration (ARA), which provided famine relief in many nations, including Germany, 
Austria, Poland, and Russia in the years after the war. The food aid program lasted into the 1920s 
and re-emerged in the Second World War era as Americans again shipped food to Europe. Both 
through government-funded programs and private initiatives, Americans shared their bounty. 
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These food aid efforts targeted war victims, even former enemies, with the twin goals of using 
American surplus goods and staving off social revolution in societies devastated by war.   
 While never fully articulated in charitable publications and propaganda, the message for 
Americans participating in food aid programs was clear—U.S. food would make the world safer, 
and would cement a relationship between American benefactors and the grateful recipients of 
aid. American leaders called for assistance for war victims with the understanding and 
expectation that Europeans would not only understand and welcome the aid, but would also 
show appropriate gratitude. Europeans did indeed thank their American benefactors with letters, 
pieces of art, homemade crafts, and personal visits, all of which helped establish sustained 
encounters between those giving aid and those receiving it. Many Americans who had provided 
the resources and labor for the projects received hand-produced tangible expressions of thanks 
from individuals within Europe, which helped validate U.S. governmental claims in both wars 
that it was intervening in world affairs to safeguard freedom and democracy. Many of the 
Europeans were often genuinely grateful for the assistance, but few imagined the price this 
gratitude might have in the long-term expectations of U.S. policymakers and the American 
general public.   
 My project analyzes how these relationships shaped both European and American 
perceptions of their relationship with each other. I argue that in the wake of American generosity 
after these two global upheavals, European expressions of gratitude for U.S. aid helped forge an 
expectation of continued indebtedness and approbation among many Americans that has shaped 
foreign policy and popular understandings of the U.S. position in the world to the present day. 
While conceived of as discrete efforts during wartime, by the 1950s, many of these humanitarian 
food relief agencies transformed into permanent aid organizations, with strong ties to U.S. 
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personnel and funds, including USAID, CARE, and UNICEF, all of which have had a global 
impact in the last half-century.  
 
Outline of the Project 
 Resources at the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), and other important U.S. archival 
collections, suggest the necessity of a three-pronged investigation of notions of gratitude and war 
relief in the period during and after World War I.  In order to drum up support among ordinary 
people for philanthropic drives, leaders of these movements had to create an imaginative 
connection between the “victims” of the European war and the “benefactors” in the United 
States. This required a massive propaganda effort, so the first aspect of this project centers on 
questions of Advertising and Recruitment. Officials involved in war and postwar relief first 
identified a perceived humanitarian crisis in Europe, and then used this crisis to advertise to a 
target population in the United States. Many of these propaganda campaigns used highly 
gendered language to contrast the innocent women and children of Europe with militaristic 
soldiery. Children were especially important to the fundraising efforts, because they were seen as 
both innocent in the war and in need of help to ensure their futures.   
Propaganda exposing the plight of children was an easy sell, as many Americans felt that 
this helpless population should not pay for the crimes of adults. As General Henry T. Allen once 
wrote to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., in regard to relief for children of former American enemies: 
“America never waged war on children, and this crisis among the children of our late enemies is 
an opportunity for us to make a striking endeavor in the interest of humanity, civilization and 
peace.”1  Publicity campaigns used pamphlets, speeches, photographs, news stories, and creative 
events to show Americans how to help. In one particularly successful fundraising scheme, major 
benefactors such as General John J. Pershing and John D. Rockefeller, Jr. attended “invisible 
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guest” dinners, where empty chairs signified 350,000 starving children and diners ate the “menu 
typical of that which America is daily giving these undernourished children.”2  Such dinners, 
which were held across the country, received much publicity and helped Americans visualize the 
needy children even more clearly. Making the case for feeding those children’s parents was a 
much harder task. 
 Recruitment of people to provide goods, money and time required a concerted 
propaganda campaign and resources for disseminating the call for volunteers. Women were 
particularly drawn into this aspect of the relief work, and their efforts made the organizations 
successful. Personal letters, news clippings, speech transcripts, and propaganda materials 
demonstrate a major effort of time and money to get the word to Americans from all social 
classes. Special efforts targeted recent immigrants, and many of the postwar food projects 
depended in part on individuals in the United States who wanted to support their family members 
still living in Europe. The ARA Food Draft program, a precursor of the post-World War II 
CARE package, allowed for this possibility by setting up a system of warehouses stocked with 
food in European hub cities. Individuals, corporations or organizations could buy drafts in the 
U.S. in the name of a recipient in Europe, facilitating a quicker and more reliable direct relief.  
The Rockefeller Foundation (RF), for instance, participated through an appropriation to an 
organization that used food drafts to aid physicians and scientists who were destitute in Vienna.
3
 
 Once propaganda efforts had taken hold in U.S. communities, the next stage in building a 
war relief effort was the organization of Aid and Logistics. Organizing and distributing the aid 
was a massive project in each of the historical periods (1914-1920s, 1920-1930s, and 1941-
1950s), so a major research focus for the project was the people and networks that made it 
happen. Food relief involved volunteer personnel both within and outside of Europe, but U.S. 
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government agencies also increasingly co-opted relief work, claiming pseudo-governmental 
organizations as their own. American presidents such as Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman 
trumpeted U.S. benevolence and saw food aid as a way to bring peace to Europe on American 
terms, often giving little credit to the thousands of local European volunteers that facilitated the 
programs’ success. 
 The RF archives are most rich in their holdings regarding the logistics of U.S. war relief, 
showing the disorganization and competition at the beginning of the war. World War I was a 
learning process both for private individuals and foundations, but also for the U.S. government, 
given its increasing expenditure for food aid. With a clear need and a vital propaganda effort 
fueling interest, scores of organizations arose to help the starving victims of the European war, 
but many of them worked at cross purposes, often muddying the field for the larger and better 
funded organizations. Americans faced a variety of claims for their money and their attention, 
with societies organized along religious or ethnic lines, groups tied to particular political causes, 
and even pet projects of prominent individuals in society. In one listing for RF officers interested 
in postwar Viennese relief, two dozen different societies were recognized for relief work in 1920 
Vienna. Many others were too small or specialized to be listed.
4
 In response, clearing houses and 
information bureaus developed, such as the National Information Bureau in New York, whose 
main job was to “vet” relief agencies.5 
 Still relatively new in 1914, the RF used the war to hone its policies on war relief through 
a process of trial and error. In that same year, after initially investing in shipping and food 
cargoes for relief of Belgium, the RF pulled back in the face of Herbert Hoover’s Commission 
for Relief in Belgium’s success in this arena, focusing instead on refugee work among Belgians 
in Holland. After being initially surprised by the war and its demands for aid, the RF spent much 
 6 
of 1915 and early 1916 developing a war relief policy to help guide them in their expenditures 
and their use of personnel in the field.
6
 By late 1916, the RF decided to limit its scope of work to 
concentrate more on specific needs, namely prisoners of war and tuberculosis, while helping the 
American Red Cross with funds toward relief of non-combatants.
7
  Despite an even more rigid 
policy in 1917, after the entry of the United States into the war, the RF retained some flexibility 
and appropriated small amounts to needy organizations on a case-by-case basis. This 
development of RF policy is one good example of the ways in which understandings of aid and 
the logistics of relief evolved over the course of the war for Americans directing these efforts. 
 After each humanitarian intervention in Europe, the people receiving the aid were 
encouraged to thank Americans for their generosity and did so with creativity and emotion. 
Expressions of Gratitude ranged from the letters of schoolchildren to embroidered flour sacks, 
to commissioned artwork, to the naming of European streets and buildings, etc.  In most cases, 
recipients of aid made it clear that they wanted to thank the U.S. for its help. In some cases, a 
more sustained personal correspondence arose between the victims and their benefactors. 
Individual members of the Rockefeller family received such tokens of thanks from European 
leaders and individuals, but the RF also received medals, artwork, and letters.  For the 
Rockefellers, who had received much negative publicity during the Congressional hearings in the 
early war years, the good publicity generated by the public expressions of gratitude must have 
been welcome.
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  One of these artistic appreciations, a decorated flour sack, was framed and hung 
in the RF offices for all visitors to see during the war, as a tangible symbol of RF and American 
benevolence.
9
 
 
 
 7 
Tentative Conclusions 
 Despite its important role in world history, U.S. food relief efforts are understudied 
within the United States, and indeed, in the broader scholarly community. There are few book-
length historical studies of the CRB, the ARA, or other food programs from 1914-1920s, and 
even fewer larger works on World War I mention these ground-breaking humanitarian efforts 
beyond the official histories written by a few participants.
10
 Herbert Hoover himself wrote about 
his food relief efforts and his biographers have touched on its role in his life, but histories of the 
RF give almost no space to its role in early war relief.
11
 The Second World War humanitarian 
projects have received some attention, but Cold War ideology has permeated many of these 
studies, focusing most attention on the issue of containment rather than humanitarian aid 
programs and their World War I precursors. Scholars have spent countless pages debating the 
logistics of the Berlin Airlift, but little work has focused on the “Quaker feedings” or on the 
relationships formed between Americans and the European recipients of their aid.  Likewise, 
major organizations such as CRALOG (Council of Relief Agencies Licensed to Operate in 
Germany) and CARE (Cooperative for American Remittances in Europe) get virtually no 
mention in studies of this period.
12
 Finally, the connections between personnel involved in both 
World War I and World War II are also a fruitful field for more research, since many American 
aid and relief workers developed their ideas in the First World War and used these ideas to shape 
their action in the 1940s and 1950s.
13
  
 Theoretically, this project relies on social history, gender theory and cultural studies 
literature for its underpinning. However, while primarily a social and cultural history of food aid 
and its consequences on the lives of ordinary people in Europe and the United States, practically 
the questions the book raise necessitate an understanding of political, diplomatic, and 
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psychological dimensions to the provision of food.  A better description of the project might be 
that of an international studies or peace studies perspective, which crosses national and 
disciplinary lines to address broad questions facing the world today and in the past.   
 This research is significant in a number of ways, most importantly as a context for the 
discussions taking place regarding American foreign policy goals and status as a world power. 
With the current U.S. president accepting a Nobel Peace Prize, while American armies continue 
to occupy Iraq and Afghanistan, the historical picture of American generosity provides a frame 
for the ongoing public understanding of the United States as a benefactor and protector of the 
world. With frequent cries from ordinary Americans in the past ten years centering on the 
question, “Why aren’t ‘they’ grateful?” for American help, the narrative I am constructing helps 
explain the origins and surprising strengths of such views. American food aid in the two world 
wars forged an image for many both inside and outside the United States of an emerging 
superpower with a conscience that was willing to feed its enemies. My project seeks to elucidate 
the broader outlines of this image in order to inform both scholarly and public debate, while also 
examining the pragmatic political and economic reasons for U.S. food aid in wartime. 
 
 
 
 
 
Editor's Note: This research report is presented here with the author’s permission but should not be cited 
or quoted without the author’s consent.  
Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports Online is a periodic publication of the Rockefeller 
Archive Center. Edited by Erwin Levold, Research Reports Online is intended to foster the network of 
scholarship in the history of philanthropy and to highlight the diverse range of materials and subjects 
covered in the collections at the Rockefeller Archive Center. The reports are drawn from essays submitted 
by researchers who have visited the Archive Center, many of whom have received grants from the 
Archive Center to support their research.  
The ideas and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and are not intended to 
represent the Rockefeller Archive Center. 
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